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BOATS IN INLAND WATERS
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
I. INTRODUCTION
United States Customs law, in 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a),' grants Cus-
toms officers virtually unlimited authority to stop and search vessels lo-
cated at any place within the United States and to use all necessary
force to compel compliance. In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez ,2 the
United States Supreme Court held that, consistent with the fourth
amendment, Customs officials, acting pursuant to this statute and with-
out any suspicion of wrongdoing, may board a vessel located in waters
providing ready access to open seas to inspect documents.
In reaching this holding, the Court distinguished its most recent
vehicle stop precedent, Delaware v. Prouse .3 In Prouse, the Court held that
1 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1980) provides that
[a]ny officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any
place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as he may be authorized,
within a customs-enforcement area established under the Anti-Smuggling Act, or at any
other authorized place, without as well as within his district, and examine the manifest
and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle
and every part thereof and any person, truck, package, or cargo on board, and to this
end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel
compliance.
The term "customs waters" is defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1980) as follows:
[I]n the case of a foreign vessel subject to a treaty or other arrangement between a for-
eign government and the United States. . . the waters within such distance of the coast
of the United States as permitted by such treaty or arrangement and, in the case of every
other vessel, the waters within four leagues of the coast of the United States.
Where American vessels are concerned, Customs waters are waters within 12 nautical miles of
the United States coast, but do not include waters inland of the coastline. United States v.
Watkins, 662 F.2d 1090, 1095 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
2 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983). While Section 1581(a) grants Customs officers such broad au-
thority to stop and search vessels, the Court limited its holding to document checks of vessels
in waters providing ready access to the open sea. Id. at 2575 n.2.
3 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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the fourth amendment prohibits police officers from stopping an auto-
mobile and detaining the driver to check his license and registration
unless they have at least articulable and reasonable suspicion of a law
violation.4 The Villamonte-Marquez Court, however, distinguished Prouse
on the basis of differences between the nature of waterborne traffic in
waters providing ready access to the open sea and the nature of vehicu-
lar traffic on highways.
5
While the distinctions asserted by the Court generally are valid, the
Court failed to explain how these distinctions eliminate the need to limit
the discretion of officers in the field. This Note argues that the Court
applied the principles of its vehicle stop precedents 6 incorrectly in con-
cluding that the fourth amendment does not proscribe suspicionless ves-
sel boardings.
The Court's departure from its vehicle stop precedents is inconsis-
tent with the fourth amendment. In the absence of at least an articul-
able suspicion of a law violation, the fourth amendment demands that
pleasure boats be detained only at fixed checkpoints.
II. FACTS OF VaL.4MONTE-MARQUEZ
Near midday on March 6, 1980, Customs officers patrolling the
Calcasieu River Ship Channel,7 some eighteen miles inland from the
Gulf Coast, sighted a forty-foot sailboat anchored in the channel.8 A
Louisiana state policeman accompanied the Customs officers, who were
following an informant's tip that a vessel in the ship channel might be
carrying marijuana. 9 After the wake created by a large freighter caused
the sailboat to rock violently, the officers sighted respondent Hamparian
on deck and asked if the sailboat and crew were all right. When the
respondent only "shrugged his shoulders in an unresponsive manner,"
one Customs officer and the policeman boarded the sailboat to check
the vessel's documentation under the authority of Section 1581(a).10
While examining the documentation, the Customs officer smelled
what he thought was burning marijuana."I The Customs officer arrested
both Hamparian and his companion, Villamonte-Marquez, after he ob-
4 Id. at 663. In Arouse, the Court was concerned primarily with the need to protect indi-
viduals from arbitrary invasions by Government officials. Id. at 661.
5 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
6 See infra note 30.
7 The majority described the ship channel as "a separate thoroughfare to the west of...
[Calcasieu] Lake through which all vessels moving between Lake Charles and the open sea of
the Gulf must traverse." Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2576.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 2577 n.3.
10 Id. at 2576-77.
11 Id.
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served 5,800 pounds of marijuana in burlap-wrapped bags when he
looked through an open hatch.
12
At trial, respondents moved to suppress the marijuana, alleging an
unlawful search and seizure of the sailboat. The District Court denied
the motion and the jury found respondents guilty of violating federal
drug laws. 13 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
conviction, holding that Customs officials may board a vessel in inland
waters only if they have either "reasonable suspicion of a Customs viola-
tion" or reason to believe the vessel has crossed the border.1 4 Because at
the time the officers boarded the vessel there was neither a nexus with
the border nor a reasonable suspicion of a law violation, the Circuit
Court ruled that the District Court had erred in denying respondents'
motion to suppress. 15 Referring to a conflict among the circuits 16 and
the importance of the question presented, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari 17 to decide whether Customs officials, acting pursuant to Sec-
tion 1581(a), constitutionally may board a vessel located in waters pro-
12 id.
13 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 652 F.2d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S.
Ct. 2573 (1983).
14 Id. at 485-86.
15 Id. at 486.
16 103 S. Ct. at 2577. While the Court professed to have granted certiorari in part to
resolve a conflict among the circuits, the lower courts that have dealt with the issue uniformly
have required a reasonable suspicion of a law violation to support an investigatory stop of a
vessel in inland waters pursuant to Section 1581 (a). See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d
500, 505 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Guillen-Linares, 643 F.2d 1054, 1056 (5th Cir.
1981). The Court, however, stressed that the Villamonte-Marquez decision is limited to waters
providing ready access to the open sea. Only the Fifth Circuit seems to have addressed this
issue. In United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145, 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
965, cert. denied sub nom. Hernandez v. United States, 446 U.S. 910 (1980), the Fifth Circuit
held that a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity will justify an investigatory stop of a vessel
in inland waters adjacent to the open Gulf of Mexico. The circuits disagree on the standard
of suspicion required to sustain a stop of a vessel in Customs waters. See United States v.
Alonso, 673 F.2d 334 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Customs officers may stop vessels in Customs waters in the absence of "even a modicum of
suspicion"). But see United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952
(1977) (Customs officers may stop vessels with articulable facts to support suspicion that the
vessel is carrying contraband). The Odneal court, however, did not mention the fact that the
boarding, which occurred 16 miles from the coast, was outside of Customs waters and there-
fore not within Customs' jurisdiction under Section 1581(a). See supra note 1.
17 The Court declined several opportunities to declare the case moot and thereby avoid a
decision on the merits. First, the Government's deportation of respondents after the Circuit
Court's reversal could have rendered the case moot. Villamonte-Masquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2575
n.2. Second, the Court could have found the case mooted by the Government's voluntary
dismissal of respondents' indictments after the Circuit Court's reversal. Id.
Relying upon United States v. Sarmiento-Rozo, 592 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1979), respon-
dents contended that their deportation made the case moot. In Sarmiento-Rozo, after the Dis-
trict Court dismissed indictments against eight Columbian seamen charged with attempted
importation of marijuana, the Government immediately deported the defendants. Id. at
1319. On appeal of the dismissal of the indictments, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case as
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viding ready access to open seas to check documents without any
suspicion of wrongdoing.' 8
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, with Justice Rehn-
quist speaking for the majority. 19 Recognizing that the language of Sec-
tion 1581(a) seems to grant Customs officers almost unlimited authority
and discretion, the Court noted that the fourth amendment 20 prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures limits such authority.2 1
In upholding the reasonableness of Section 1581(a), the Court rested its
decision almost exclusively upon two arguments. First, the enactment of
the lineal ancestor of Section 1581(a) by the same Congress that promul-
moot because the deportation of the defendants "deprived the controversy... of any 'im-
pact of actuality.'" Id. at 1320.
While Justice Rehnquist recognized that Sarmiento-Rozo provided "some authority for
respondents' argument," he rejected the respondents' contention. illamonte-Masquez, 103 S.
Ct. at 2575 n.2. Relying on United States v. Campos-Serano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971), he noted
that "as a collateral consequence of the convictions, the Government could bar any attempt
by respondents to voluntarily re-enter this country." Id. Furthermore, if the respondents
managed to re-enter the United States they would be subject to arrest and imprisonment for
the convictions. Id.
Respondents also argued that the voluntary dismissal of the indictment in the District
Court, following the reversal by the Court of Appeals, rendered the case moot. Apparently,
no court has decided whether an indictment may be reinstated after a voluntary dismissal by
the prosecution under Rule 48(a) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. The
majority in Villamonle-Masquez held that a successful effort by the Government to reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals would reinstate the judgment of conviction because upon a
defendant's conviction, an indictment is merged into the conviction and the sentencing. 103
S. Ct. at 2576 n.2. In his dissent, however, Justice Brennan correctly noted that the doctrine
of merger means only "that the indictment can be attacked on appeal from the conviction,
and if it is defective, the entire conviction and sentence falls." Id. at 2584 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
Justice Brennan distinguished Villamonte-Marquez from cases in which the Court has al-
lowed appeals from a mandatory dismissal entered to comply with a lower court's mandate.
See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). In Villamonte-Marquez, however, the Gov-
ernment was not compelled to dismiss the indictment and Manctsi is not applicable.
Finally, the Court could have refused certiorari because the United States permitted
both the stay and an extension granted by the Court of Appeals to expire before it filed its
petition for writ of certiorari. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2583 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2575, 2577.
19 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, O'Connor, White and Blackmun joined Jus-
tice Rehnquist.
20 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularity describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578.
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gated the Bill of Rights gives the statute an "impressive historical pedi-
gree."'22 Second, the nature of waterborne traffic in waters providing
ready access to the open sea is sufficiently different from the nature of
vehicular traffic on highways to make alternatives to random stops less
likely to accomplish the governmental purposes involved.
2 3
In 1790 the First Congress enacted the Act of August 4, 1790 "to
provide more effectually for the collection of the duties imposed by law
on goods. . imported into the United States."' 24 The Court regarded
Section 31 of that Act as the lineal ancestor of 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (a), upon
which the government sought to sustain the vessel boarding in Vil-
lamonle-Marquez.25 Conceding that "no Act of Congress can authorize a
violation of the Constitution," the Court agreed with respondents' con-
tention that the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures circumscribes the statute. 26 Because the same
Congress that had promulgated the Bill of Rights also enacted Section
31, the Court believed that "the members of that body did not regard
searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable,' and they are not
embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.
'2 7
Continuing its inquiry into the constitutionality of the boarding,
22 Id.
23 Id. at 2582.
24 Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145 (1845).
25 Section 31 of the Act of August 4, 1790 grants Customs officials almost identical au-
thority to that granted by 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). The Act was adopted during the second
session of the First Congress. During its first session, the First Congress had promulgated the
Act of July 31, 1789, which had not granted such broad authority to Customs officials.
Section 24 of the 1789 Act granted Customs officials the authority to enter vessels in
which they had reason to suspect dutiable goods were concealed. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1
Stat. 29, 43 (1845). Section 24 was re-enacted by the First Congress in 1790, with only minor
punctuation changes, as Section 48 of the Act of August 4, 1790. Section 31 of the 1790 Act,
however, granted Customs officials broader authority to board "vessels in any part of the
United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound to the United States" for
the purposes of demanding manifests and of searching the vessels, the cabin, and every other
part of the vessel." Act of August 5, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, 164 (1845).
It is unclear why Congress omitted the "reason to suspect" standard contained in Section
24 of the 1789 Act and Section 48 of the 1790 Act. Two facts may explain the lack of an
explicit standard in Section 31. The two provisions appear to serve different purposes: the
primary purpose of Section 31 was to provide for manifest checks, while that of Section 48
was to provide for inspections for dutiable goods. Since Section 31 also grants almost identi-
cal authority to inspect for dutiable goods without any suspicion, this argument seems unsat-
isfactory. Alternatively, Section 31 could grant broader authority because it was intended to
provide a more effective law enforcement tool. While the 1789 Act was entitled "An Act to
regulate the Collection of the Duties," Congress entitled the 1790 Act "An Act to provide
more effectually for the collection of the duties."
26 Villamonte-Masquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 272 (1973)).
27 Id. at 2579 (original emphasis removed) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886)).
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the Court noted that its focus in fourth amendment law has been on the
reasonableness of the governmental intrusions. 28 The Court has ana-
lyzed the reasonableness of a particular law enforcement practice by
balancing the practice's intrusion on an individual's fourth amendment
interests against its promotion of substantial governmental interests.
29
In Villamonte-Marquez, the Court began by examining the balance previ-
ously struck in its vehicle stop and search cases.30 The majority noted
that these past decisions generally required that officers stop citizens at
roadblock-type stops or on the basis of some degree of particularized
suspicion. Justice Rehnquist contended that the less intrusive and less
awesome nature of fixed checkpoints was responsible in part for the dif-
ference in outcomes between the roving patrol stop struck down in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce3t and the fixed checkpoint stop upheld in
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.32 Citing Brzgnoni-Ponce, Martinez-Fuerte
and Delaware v. Prouse,33 the Court conceded that "if the Customs officer
in this case had stopped an automobile on a public highway near the
border, rather than a vessel in a ship channel, the stop would have run
afoul of the Fourth Amendment because of the absence of articulable
suspicion.'
34
The Court, however, distinguished investigatory stops of vessels in
waters offering ready access to the open sea from stops of automobiles on
principal thoroughfares in the border area.35 First, permanent check-
points like those upheld in Martinez-Fuerte are not "practical on waters
such as these where vessels can move in any direction at any time and
need not follow established 'avenues' as automobiles must do."'36 Sec-
ond, documentation requirements applicable to vessels differ signifi-
cantly from the system of vehicle licensing that prevails generally
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (in the absence of at least a reasonable
suspicion that the car is being driven contrary to law, the fourth amendment prohibits stop-
ping an automobile at random to check driver's license and vehicle registration); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (the fourth amendment permits stopping an
automobile at a fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants, even where there is no
reason to believe the particular car contains illegal aliens); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1974) (the fourth amendment forbids stopping an automobile at random to ask
the occupants about their citizenship without reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (the fourth amendment prohibits the
search of an automobile, without probable cause or consent, on a road at least 20 miles north
of the Mexican border).
31 422 U.S. 873 (1974).
32 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
33 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
34 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2579.
35 Id. at 2579-80.
36 Id. at 2580.
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throughout the United States.3 7 Document checks of highway vehicles
are not necessary because police officers patrolling highways often can
determine merely by observing a vehicle's license plate whether that ve-
hicle is in current compliance with state law. 38 Neither the federal nor
state governments issue comparable "license plates" or "stickers" for ves-
sels. 39 Furthermore, the statutes and regulations governing maritime
documentation are more complex than the typical state requirements
for vehicle licensing.
40
After distinguishing Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerle, the Court
balanced the competing interests, ignoring the balance previously struck
in the automobile stop cases. The Court found that the need to make
document checks is great and that enforcement of documentation laws
substantially furthers the public interest.4 1 The Court deemed the resul-
tant intrusion on fourth amendment interests to be quite limited, involv-
ing "only a brief detention where officials come on board, visit public
areas of the vessel, and inspect documents. '42 Because the government
interest in assuring compliance with documentation laws is substantial,
particularly in waters where the need to deter smuggling is great, and
37 Id.
38 Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1979)).
39 Id. The Court noted that
[bloth of the required exterior markings on documented vessels-the name and the hail-
ing port-as well as the numerals displayed by undocumented American boats, are
marked at the instance of the owner. . . . [W]here the vessel is of foreign registry it
carries only the markings required by its home port.
Id.
40 Id. at 2580-81. A vessel must be documented to engage in many commercial marine
activities such as coastwide trade, 46 U.S.C. § 65(1) (Supp. IV 1980); trade on the Great
Lakes, 46 U.S.C. § 65(j); and the fishing trade. 46 U.S.C. § 65(k). A vessel may not be
employed in trades other than those covered by its certificate of documentation. 46 U.S.C.
§ 65(m).
While pleasure vessels need not be documented, 46 U.S.C. § 65(1), all undocumented
vessels equipped with any type of propulsion machinery must have a state-issued number
displayed on the exterior of the vessel, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1466, 1470 (1976), and a certificate of
number available for inspection on the vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 1469(a) (1976).
The master of every vessel which is required to make entry upon arriving in the United
States must have on board a "manifest." 19 U.S.C. § 1431(a). Such vessels of foreign regis-
try, must deliver a copy of the "manifest" td Customs officials. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1439.
Before foreign vessels proceed from one Customs district to another, the master must obtain a
permit to proceed. 46 U.S.C. § 313 (1958). Before any vessel departs American waters, its
master must deliver its manifest to Customs officials and obtain clearance. 46 U.S.C. § 91
(1958).
41 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581. The Court found that the documentation laws
are "the linchpin for regulation of participation in certain trades, such as fishing, salvaging,
towing, and dredging, as well as areas in which trade is sanctioned, and for enforcement of
various environmental laws." Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that documentation checks
play a vital role in the collection of duties, assist the Government in preventing the smuggling
of contraband, and contribute to ensuring safety on American waterways. Id.
42 Id. at 2581.
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the resultant intrusion is only modest, the Court concluded that the
boarding was consistent with the fourth amendment.
43
B. THE DISSENT
After devoting substantial attention to the mootness issue,44 Justice
Brennan's dissent 45 focused on the Court's holdings in the automobile
stop and search cases.46 Justice Brennan contended that these "cases
uniformly hold that any stop or search requires probable cause, reason-
able suspicion, or another discretion-limiting feature such as the use of
43 Id. at 2582.
44 See supra note 17.
45 In a footnote, Justice Brennan also attacked the "impressive historical pedigree" of
Section 1581(a), relying in part upon Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927). Villamonte-
Masquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2586 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan first contended that Section 31 authorized suspicionless boardings of
only those vessels that were bound to the United States. Section 31 authorized the boarding
of vessels "in any part of the United States, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, if bound
to the United States. . . ." Act of August 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145, 165 (1845) (emphasis
added). Justice Brennan contended that the phrase "if bound to the United States" qualifies
both clauses that precede it. Villamonte-Masquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2586 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). The majority rejected Justice Brennan's construction of Section 31, recognizing the
absurdity of a statute that would authorize the boarding of a vessel found "in any part of the
United States" only if that vessel were "bound to the United States." Id. at 2578 n.4.
Justice Brennan also argued that, to preserve Section 48's "reason to suspect" standard,
Section 31 must be read to apply only to ships entering the country. Id. at 2586 n.7; see also
supra note 25. Justice Rehnquist noted in the majority opinion that Section 48 applied only
to searches and seizures of dutiable goods, while only Section 31 deals with boardings to
inspect documents. Id. at 2578 n.4. Because the two sections were concerned with different
matters, nothing in one section could be read to limit the other. Section 31's broad grant of
authority to search for and seize dutiable goods, however, undermines Justice Rehnquist's
argument.
The First Congress may have intended the "reason to suspect" standard to apply only to
those vessels that were either on the high seas or within four leagues of the coast, but not
bound for the United States. While Section 31 only applied to those vessels that were either
in the United States or within four leagues of the coast and bound for the United States,
Section 48 included no similar jurisdictional restriction.
Finally, Justice Brennan argued that in Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927), the
Court had recognized that "it was not until the enactment of the present statute in 1922 that
Congress purported to authorize suspicionless boardings of vessels without regard to whether
there had been any border crossing." Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2586 n.7. The majority
correctly noted that Justice Brennan had misread Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in
Maul. Id. at 2578 n.4. In Maul, Justice Brandeis was referring to a change that Congress had
made to a predecessor of Section 1581 (a) in 1922, omitting the phrase "if bound to the United
States." 274 U.S. at 528-29. Justice Brandeis concluded that it was not until 1922 that Con-
gress had authorized document boardings of a vessel within four leagues of the coast without
regard to whether or not that vessel was bound to the United States. Id. Justice Brandeis'
concurring opinion offers no support for Justice Brennan's position, however, because the
vessel stopped in Villamonte-Marquez was in inland waters, and not Customs waters. See supra
note 1.
46 See supra note 30.
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fixed checkpoints instead of roving patrols. '47 Reaffirming the need to
limit the discretion of officers in the field, Justice Brennan took issue
with the majority's departure from Brzgnoni-Pnce and Prouse, finding
three basic flaws in the reasoning of the majority.
48
First, he contended that the majority had overlooked the "primary
and overarching" concern that has guided the Court in previous deci-
sions: an unqualified and consistent rejection of "standardless and un-
constrained discretion" that would subject individual liberties to the
whims of police officers in the field.49 Second, the supposed factual dif-
ferences between vehicle and vessel stops are either insubstantial or of
the government's own making.50 Finally, Justice Brennan asserted that
it is "a non sequitur to reason that because the police in a given situa-
tion claim to need more intrusive and arbitrary enforcement tools than
the Fourth Amendment has been held to permit," the Court may dis-
pense with the amendment's protections.5 1
Justice Brennan reminded the Court that there were two reasons
that the Court upheld the fixed checkpoint in Marinez-Fuerle while strik-
ing down the roving-patrol stop of Brzgnoni-Ponce. Fixed checkpoints
both decrease the intrusiveness of the stop52 and significantly limit the
discretion of officers in the field and the consequent potential for its
abuse.53 The Court reaffirmed the holding in Bn'gnoni-Pnce by striking
down the roving-patrol stop of an automobile for a random license and
registration check in Delaware v. Prouse.54
Justice Brennan maintained that the Court could not justify its de-
parture from Brzgnoni-Ponce and Delaware v. Prouse by asserting a differ-
ence in the degree of intrusiveness.55  The intrusion here was
47 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2585 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 2586. While Justice Brennan later elaborated on the first two flaws, he confined
his discussion of the third flaw to a restatement of his first proposition. See id. at 2590-91.
49 Id. at 2586 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50 Id.
st Id.
52 Id. at 2587. Fixed checkpoint stops intrude less than roving patrol operations because
they generate less fear and concern on the part of stopped travelers. "At traffic checkpoints
the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the
officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-895 (1975); see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558-
59.
53 Fixed checkpoint operations limit the discretion of the officers in the field because
[t]he location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials
responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited
enforcement resources. . . .And since field officers may stop only those cars passing the
checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals ..
Marinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559; see also Or/is, 422 U.S. at 894.
54 Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; see Villamonle-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2587 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2588.
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significantly more severe than those in Brzgnoni-Ponce and Delaware v.
Prouse, which the Court held permissible only on reasonable suspicion.
56
Unlike those cases, the intrusion here involved not only a mere stopping
and questioning, but an actual boarding of a private vessel, more similar
to the entry of a private house.5 7 Since boats often serve as a temporary
residence, persons on boats have a greater expectation of privacy than
do persons in cars.
58
Justice Brennan next contended that supposed special law enforce-
ment problems in the maritime setting did not justify the majority's de-
parture from Bn'gnoni-Ponce and Delaware v. Prouse. First, the geography
of the Calcasieu River Ship Channel is sufficiently similar to an inter-
state highway to permit the establishment of a fixed checkpoint.59 Even
if fixed checkpoints were impractical, Justice Brennan argued that Cus-
toms officials could implement a neutral selection system that would de-
crease the opportunity for arbitrariness or harassment.6° Furthermore,
adequate law enforcement does not require random stops because the
characteristics of smuggling operations tend to generate articulable
grounds for identifying law violators.6 1 Finally, Justice Brennan noted
several alternatives that would obviate the need for documentation
56 Id.
57 id.
58 Id. at 2588-89.
59 See supra note 7.
60 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2590 n.10.
61 Id. at 2590. As Justice Brennan noted, the case law suggests that Customs officials have
conducted many boardings in response to at least a reasonable suspicion of a violation of the
law. See, e.g., United States v. Glen-Archilla, 677 F.2d 809, 812 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 165 (1982) (Customs officers detected marijuana odor while offering assistance to disabled
vessel); Blair v. United States, 665 F.2d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1981) (Customs officers observed
vessel riding low in the water with vessel lettering improperly displayed); United States v.
Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1981) (Coast Guard officers first observed vessel drifting
dead in the water with no visible cargo and then starting its engines when sighted by a Coast
Guard patrol airplane); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1070 (5th Cir. 1980) (Coast
Guard observed crew members "waving clothes, toilet paper, and flashlights and giving hand
signals"; one crewman dove overboard and informed the Coast Guard that there was "dirty
business" on board); United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 788 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 967, stay deniedsub non. Brazas v. United States, 445 U.S. 949 (1980) (police officer
observed vessel at loading dock of warehouse shortly before large amounts of marijuana were
discovered in the warehouse); United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145, 1149 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 965, cert. deniedsub non. Hernandez v. United States, 446 U.S. 910 (1980)
(Customs officers observed shrimping vessel, traveling at midnight in a ship channel without
navigation lights, extinguish all lights and enter an area not normally frequented by shrimp-
ing vessels, and then rendezvous with a darkened vessel after an exchange of lights); United
States v. Castro, 596 F.2d 674, 675 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1980) (Florida
marine patrol officer observed shrimping vessel in an area known for smuggling with high
speed boats going to and from the vessel); United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1306
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980) (Customs officers observed vessel riding heavy
in the bow and speeding through the intercoastal waterway and several "no wake" areas).




The Villamonte-Marquez decision is flawed in two respects. First, the
majority placed too much emphasis upon the lineal ancestry of Section
1581(a). Second, in applying the fourth amendment balancing test, the
majority overstated the interests of the government while understating
the interests of individuals.
A. LINEAL ANCESTRY
As part of its inquiry into the constitutionality of Section 1581(a),
the Court examined the constitutionality of Section 31 of the Act of
August 4, 1790, which was the lineal ancestor of Section 1581(a). Jus-
tice Rehnquist contended that the enactment of Section 31 demon-
strated that the first Congress believed it was reasonable to allow
Customs officers to board vessels to search for dutiable goods without
any suspicion of customs violations. 63 Justice Rehnquist, however, ig-
nored those arguments that undermine his premise that Acts of the first
Congress are indicative of what is reasonable today.
64
Even if the first Congress considered suspicionless vessel boardings
reasonable, the Court should have interpreted the fourth amendment in
light of what is reasonable today. Construing Section 1581(a) in United
States v. Slreifel,65 the Second Circuit rejected the same historical argu-
ment relied upon by Justice Rehnquist, reasoning that the intent of the
first Congress is not dispositive of what is reasonable today. While in
1789 boardings were probably the only means by which documentation
could be checked, radio communication today enables officials to obtain
62 Villamonle-M"arquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2590. Justice Brennan suggested that the Government
could provide uniform license plates giving visible evidence of compliance with registration
laws. Id. Alternatively, rather than boarding a vessel, officials could merely come alongside
the subject vessel or request that someone come aboard the Customs vessel. Id. Furthermore,
Customs officials could use radio communication to keep track of documentation and regis-
tration matters. Id.
63 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2578.
64 Courts and commentators have undermined the historical argument relied on by the
majority to establish the reasonableness of Section 1581 (a). See, e.g., United States v. Streifel,
665 F.2d 414, 420 n.8 (2d Cir. 1981) (even if First Congress intended to allow boardings
without probable cause, courts are bound to interpret the fourth amendment in light of con-
temporary notions of privacy as well as contemporary technology); United States v. Williams,
617 F.2d 1063, 1081 (5th Cir. 1980) (First Congress' construction of the fourth amendment is
not dispositive of what is reasonable today); Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1011 (1968) (changes in the community's standard of reasonableness
and the underlying facts may make a search that was reasonable in 1789 unreasonable
today).
65 665 F.2d 414, 419 n.8 (2d Cir. 1981).
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answers to various questions and speedy confirmation. 66 Furthermore,
in 1789 Customs officers could reasonably suspect that any merchant
vessel contained dutiable goods because most sea-going vessels were
either merchant ships or warships.
6 7
B. APPLICATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
As a general rule, the fourth amendment prohibits searches without
warrants, even if the facts establish probable cause.68 The Constitution
requires "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer
...be interposed between the citizens and the police .... 69 There
are, however, specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to
this rule.70 The courts have employed several of these exceptions to jus-
tify warrantless boardings and searches of vessels: 71 (1) "stop and frisk"
detentions; (2) automobile searches; (3) border searches; 72 and (4) ad-
66 Id.
67 Williams, 617 F.2d at 1080. While in 1789 most vessels were either commercial or mili-
tary in nature, "[t]oday, over eight million recreational craft are numbered under the federal
and state numbering systems for undocumented pleasure vessels .... These figures do not
include pleasure yachts whose owners have voluntarily obtained federal documentation, or
sailboats having no propulsion machinery, which are generally exempt from the numbering
requirements." Brief for Respondents at 19 n.8, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S.
Ct. 2573 (1983) (citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BOATING STA-
TISTIcS 1981 at 10 (May, 1982)).
68 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
69 Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963)).
70 Id. at 357.
71 See generally Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51, 81
(1977); Comment, Searches at Sea, 93 HARV. L. REv. 725, 727 (1980).
72 Officers may conduct warrantless searches of vessels without any suspicion of a law
violation where they have grounds to believe the vessel has entered from international waters.
See,e.g., United States v. Ingham, 502 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (5th Cir. 1974),cert. denied, 421 U.S.
911 (1975) (upholding warrantless non-probable cause search of a vessel where sightings of
the vessel "proved quite convincingly that the vessel had been at a foreign port or place"); cf.
United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980)
(refusing to uphold search of vessel as a border search because officers did not have articul-
able facts from which they could reasonably infer that the boat had come from international
waters).
Entrance into the United States justifies border searches even when they are conducted
without warrants and without suspicion. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
The Court has stated that "[t]ravellers may be so stopped in crossing an international bound-
ary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to iden-
tify himself as entitled to come in and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought
in." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (dictum).
Border searches, however, may be conducted only at the border or its functional
equivalent. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973). The Court has
noted two functional equivalents of the border: (1) an established checkpoint at the conflu-
ence of two or more roads that extend from the border; and (2) a domestic airport upon the
arrival of a non-stop flight from another country. Id.
The border search exception did not apply in Villamonte-Marquez because there were no
grounds to believe that the vessel had entered from international waters. The Court only
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ministrative searches of pervasively regulated industries. 73 In Villamonte-
Marquez, however, only the "stop and frisk" and the automobile excep-
tions provide guidance in determining whether the boarding was
reasonable.
The "stop and frisk" exception, as typified by Terry v. Ohio ,74 and
the automobile exception, as typified by Carroll v. United States,75 are
both based upon unforeseeable encounters that present officers only a
fleeting opportunity to conduct a search. In both situations the Court
relied on the limited nature of the intrusion and the strong governmen-
tal need for swift action.
The Terry Court authorized a warrantless "stop and frisk" deten-
tion of a suspect where officers had reason to believe that the individual
was armed and dangerous. 76 The stop did not require probable cause
because a limited search for weapons entails a lesser intrusion than a
full-scale search. 77 Although Tery was predicated upon swift action ne-
cessitated by on-the-spot observations, the Court warned that "police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.
'78
Under the "automobile exception," law enforcement officers may
considered the issue of whether Customs officers could stop a vessel in inland waters to check
its documentation. 103 S. Ct. at 2575.
73 The "administrative search" exception to the warrant requirement generally has been
restricted to those businesses that historically have been subjected to close government regula-
tion. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (mining industry); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms industry); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor industry); United States ex rel. Terrauano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d
682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974) (pharmaceutical industry). The Court has
upheld warrantless inspections of these businesses based on both the need for unannounced
inspections to promote effective enforcement and the implied consent of the businessman,
who in effect consents to such inspections by entering into a regulated industry. Biswell, 406
U.S. at 316.
At least one court has attempted to analyze warrantless vessel boardings in the context of
the administrative search exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Hilton, 619
F.2d 127, 132 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 (1980). Clearly, because of a vessel's mobil-
ity, a warrant requirement would frustrate effective law enforcement. Furthermore, extensive
maritime regulation may have diminished vessel occupants' expectations of privacy.
In Almeida-Sanchez, the Court refused to extend the administrative search exception to
include searches of automobiles. Users of automobiles are not businessmen who must accept
the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade in a regulated industry. 413 U.S. at 271.
While the exception may extend to commercial vessels because of the long history of maritime
regulation, it cannot be applied to pleasure boats. The Court in Vllamonte-Marquez rightly
ignored the administrative search exception in its analysis.
74 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (a veteran police officer, suspecting three men of "casing" a store,
spun one man around, patted the outside of his clothing, and found a revolver).
75 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (Federal prohibition agents, passing a car that they reasonably
believed was transporting illegal liquor, stopped and searched the car without a warrant).
76 392 U.S. at 27.
77 Id. at 25.
78 Id. at 20.
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conduct warrantless searches of automobiles where they have probable
cause to believe that contraband is present. The Carroll Court recog-
nized that often "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought." 79 Again, however, the Court warned that
"where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be
used. .. ."80
The Court analyzed Villamonle-Marquez in the context of the auto-
mobile investigatory detention cases,8 ' which are a hybrid of the "stop
and frisk" exception and the "automobile exception." While vehicle de-
tention cases are characterized by the mobility that concerned the Court
in Carroll, they also exhibit the lesser intrusion that the Court addressed
in Te7y. Because of the limited nature of the intrusion, investigatory
stops82 by roving patrols do not require probable cause, but only articul-
able and reasonable suspicion of a law violation.8 3 Where roving patrols
conduct such stops, the police must comply with the reasonable suspi-
cion standard because the fourth amendment's reasonableness require-
ment demands that the government be restrained from exercising
"broad and unlimited discretion" when conducting investigatory
stops. 84 Suspicionless detentions at fixed checkpoints are constitution-
ally permissible because they are less intrusive and involve less discre-
tionary enforcement activity than those conducted by roving patrols.8
5
As the Court stated in Prouse, "the permissibility of a particular law
79 267 U.S. at 153.
80 Id. at 156. The Court has not adhered to its warning that police must obtain a warrant
where it is practicable. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (upholding a warrantless
seizure of an automobile and search of its exterior at a police impoundment area after police
had arrested the owner and removed the car from a public lot); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970) (upholding an unwarranted search of a car after the occupants had been
arrested and the car had been driven to the police station). The Cardwell court cited another
distinguishing factor in automobile cases: "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor
vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as a
repository of personal effects." Id. at 590. Commentators have criticized the Court's willing-
ness to extend Carroll. See Comment, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Withoutjusli-
fication, 32 HASTnNGS L.J. 127, 128 (1980); Comment, The Automobile Exception to the Warrant
Requirement, Speeding Awayfrom the Fourth Amendment, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 637, 637 (1980).
81 See supra note 30.
82 Investigatory stops differ from searches. An investigatory stop of an automobile consists
of questioning occupants about citizenship, as in Bgnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 874, or checking
a driver's license and vehicle registration, as in Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650. Although an investi-
gatory stop does not constitute a search, detention of an automobile and its occupants is a
"seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, even though the purpose of the stop
is limited and the resulting detention is brief. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653; Martinez-Ferie, 428
U.S. at 556; Ten', 392 U.S. at 16.
83 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881; cf. Ter,, 392 U.S. at 27.
84 rouse, 440 U.S. at 654-655; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882; Teny, 392 U.S. at 21-22.
85 See supra notes 52-53.
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enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests."8 16 In Vilamonte-Marquez, Justice Rehnquist con-
tended that the enforcement of documentation laws substantially fur-
thered the public interest.8 7 Although the Court did not explicitly
address the issue, it is likely that it also considered enforcement of anti-
smuggling laws8 8 a substantial government interest because of "[t]he re-
cent increase in the smuggling of drugs into the United States by sea
transportation."
89
The question of the constitutionality of a particular law enforce-
ment practice does not end with the determination that the government
has substantial interests at stake. The Court must determine whether
the practice sufficiently furthers the government interests to justify its
intrusion upon fourth amendment interests.90 Where commercial ves-
sels are involved, random document checks are more likely to further
the government's interest in proper documentation 9 ' than were the ran-
dom license and registration checks that the Court struck down in Dela-
ware v. Prouse .92 Because the documentation laws are largely
commercial in nature, however, it is unlikely that random boardings of
pleasure boats will further the government's interest in their
enforcement.
93
There was no evidence before the Court indicating that the govern-
ment's interest in enforcing the anti-smuggling laws would be ham-
86 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654.
87 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581; see also supra notes 39-40.
88 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1711 (1980) (the act is cited as the "Anti-Smuggling Act").
89 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 104 (Supp. 1983) (footnote omitted); see Villamonte-
Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2582; id. at 2588 n.8. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659.
91 See supra notes 40-41.
92 Finding no evidence to the contrary, the Prouse Court assumed that "finding an unli-
censed driver among those who commit traffic violations is a much more likely event than
finding an unlicensed driver by choosing randomly from the entire universe of drivers." 440
U.S. at 659. Therefore, the Court concluded that random checks did not substantially further
the Government's interest in highway safety.
93 The Court argued that it is difficult to draw lines between commercial vessels and
pleasure boats: "Respondents assert that they were in a 'pleasure boat,' yet they proved to be
involved in a highly lucrative commercial trade." Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2581 n.6.
The Supreme Court cannot partially justify a warrantless search by measuring the yields
of that search. Searches must be reasonable at the time they are conducted: "[A] search is not
to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not
change character from its success." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (foot-
note omitted). One commentator has noted: "[U]nless the Fourth Amendment controls tom-
peeping and subjects it to a requirement of antecedent cause to believe that what is inside any
particular window is indeed criminal, police may look through windows and observe a thou-
sand innocent acts for every guilty act they spy out." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 403 (1974).
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pered by requiring Customs officers to have at least reasonable suspicion
of illegal activity before boarding pleasure boats. In fact, as Justice
Brennan noted, the case law suggests that maritime smuggling opera-
tions tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators.
94
The majority seemed to assert that the government's need for suspi-
cionless boardings was especially substantial because no effective alter-
native exists for enforcement of documentation laws. Since the balance
struck by the Court in the vehicle stop precedents only permits suspi-
cionless document checks at fixed checkpoints, 95 the majority's holding
turned upon their conclusion that "no reasonable claim can be made
that permanent checkpoints would be practical on waters . . . where
vessels can move in any direction at any time and need not follow estab-
lished 'avenues' as automobiles must do."96 Justice Brennan, however,
noted that the boarding took place in a ship channel, which provided an
opportunity for effective fixed checkpoint inspection.
97
Even if fixed checkpoints were impractical in the Villamonte-Marquez
case, the Court's previous search and seizure cases do not support the
conclusion that the fourth amendment permits suspicionless stops. Jus-
tice Rehnquist ignored the central requirement of Carroll, Tery, Brzinoni-
Ponce, Martinez-Fueree and their progeny: the Court has consistently in-
sisted that "standardless and unconstrained. . . discretion of the official
in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent."98 The majority in
Villamonte-Marquez made no attempt to restrain the discretion of Cus-
toms officers acting pursuant to Section 1581 (a), apparently concluding
that, because the nature of waterborne commerce in waters providing
ready access to the open sea makes the use of fixed checkpoints impracti-
cal, the fourth amendment requires no limit on the discretion of Cus-
toms officers.
After overstating the governmental interest in conducting random
documentation checks,99 the Court substantially understated the result-
ing impact upon vessel owners' expectations of privacy. Even without
the physical intrusion of an actual boarding, a stop to check documents
is a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment and therefore
is governed by its reasonableness requirement. 1°°
The Prouse Court characterized the physical and psychological in-
trusions that result from random document checks of automobiles as
94 See supra note 6 1.
95 See supra notes 52-53.
96 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2580.
97 Id. at 2589 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
99 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
100 See supra note 82.
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involving an unsettling show of authority, interfering with freedom of
movement, and creating substantial anxiety.10 ' Vessel occupants have
even greater privacy expectations than do passengers in automobiles.
Vessels are more likely to serve as residences, even if only temporarily. 102
While the majority deemed investigatory detentions to be only a minor
inconvenience, safety and documentation checks may encompass a sig-
nificantly greater intrusion than automobile stops, including a thorough
examination of virtually all areas of the vessel.10 3 As Justice Brennan
realized, the intrusion upheld here was substantial; it not only involved
"a mere stopping and questioning. . . but an actual boarding of a pri-
vate vessel. . . more similar to entry of a private house than to the stops
in Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse.'
0 4
The Court incorrectly struck the balance between the governmen-
tal interests furthered by random vessel boardings and the intrusion on
fourth amendment interests that boardings entail. The basic objective
of the fourth amendment "is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."'
0 5
Absent some restriction on the discretion of officers in the field, the in-
trusion on vessel occupants' privacy expectations outweighs the govern-
mental interests furthered by such boardings.
The Villamonte-Marquez decision effectively authorizes the use of sus-
picionless document boardings as a pretext for conducting smuggling
investigations. Even if the Court was correct in its conclusion that such
random stops are necessary to further the government's interest, the
Court could have imposed constraints upon the authority of Customs
101 Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657.
102 The privacy expectation of vessel owners exceeds that of automobile drivers because "a
vessel is far more likely to serve as the temporary residence of the owner or crew, and is
generally less open to public view, than an automobile." Comment, supra note 71, at 728
(footnote omitted); see also United States v. Cadena, 588 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The
ship is the sailor's home. There is hardly the expectation of privacy even in the curtained
limousine or the stereo-equipped van that every mariner or yachtsman expects aboard his
vessel"); United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d 826, 829-30 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950
(1979) (while extensive regulation and large area within plain view of public may result in
somewhat decreased privacy expectations, vessel occupants may have a heightened expecta-
tion of privacy with respect to certain areas of a boat, such as living quarters or locked com-
partments on the bridge).
103 Inspectors routinely compare the vessel's main beam number with the number on its
registration papers, which requires entering the hold of a commercial or semi-commercial
craft or the main living area of a pleasure vessel. "[O]ther areas of the vessel, including the
engine room or compartment and the marine toilet, are also routinely subject to inspection."
Comment, supra note 71, at 743; see also United States v. Jones, 639 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1981)
(during documentation check, Coast Guard boarding crew entered cabin area and/or for-
ward hold); United States v. Shelnut, 625 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 983
(1981) (same); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1976) (same).
104 Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2588 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
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officials conducting document checks pursuant to Section 1581 (a). Such
constraints would limit officer discretion and thereby reduce the intru-
sion upon vessel occupants' privacy expectations. First, the Court could
have required document checks to be conducted in a reasonable and
unintrusive manner, prohibiting, for example, Customs officials from
conducting such document checks at night. Second, the inspections
could have been limited to examination of documents and papers unless
probable cause develops to support an increase in the scope of the
search. Courts should not permit vessel identification checks to take offi-
cials into the living areas of any vessel, without either probable cause or
consent of the owners. Finally, the Court could have required officials,
before boarding, to give a statement to the vessel occupants delineating
both the purpose of the boarding and the permissible scope of the
inspection.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Villamonte-Marquez allows Customs officers
to substantially invade the fourth amendment rights of citizens without
sufficiently furthering a substantial government interest. Furthermore,
the decision offers citizens no protection from Customs officials, who
may now use their unconstrained discretion to stop, board and search
any vessel in inland waters providing ready access to the open sea with-
out any suspicion of wrongdoing.
Random vessel boardings are not consistent with the fourth amend-
ment. A requirement of reasonable suspicion of illegal activity would
adequately protect the public interest because random document in-
spections of pleasure boats are unlikely to further the public interest in
enforcement of documentation laws. While the intrusiveness of vessel
boardings exceeds that of the automobile stop invalidated in Delaware v.
Prouse, such random detentions are no more likely to further the pro-
fessed governmental interest. Since maritime smuggling activities tend
to generate articulable grounds for identifying smugglers, a reasonable
suspicion requirement would minimize the intrusion upon the rights of
individuals and, at the same time, allow law enforcement officials suffi-
cient authority to detect smuggling and other law violations.
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